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GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 This matter comes on before this Court on an appeal from 
an order of the District Court entered March 28, 2013, denying 
defendants-appellants, the American Academy of Orthopaedic 
Surgeons and the American Association of Orthopaedic 
Surgeons’ (together the “AAOS”), motion for judgment as a 
matter of law and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.  For 
the reasons we set forth we will affirm the March 28, 2013 
order.   
 The AAOS is a voluntary professional organization for 
orthopaedic surgeons, which has adopted professional standards, 
including member grievance procedures.  Though most 
orthopaedic surgeons are members of the AAOS, it is not a 
licensing authority and consequently an orthopaedic surgeon 
need not be an AAOS member to practice orthopaedic surgery.  
This case is an outgrowth of an AAOS grievance proceeding 
that an AAOS member, Dr. Menachem Meller, initiated against 
another AAOS member, plaintiff-appellee Dr. Steven R. 
Graboff, a California-based orthopaedic surgeon.  Dr. Meller 
filed the grievance claiming that Dr. Graboff wrote an 
inaccurate report based on incomplete information that was used 
against him in a civil malpractice case.  The report charged that 
Dr. Meller departed from reasonable and accepted standards of 
medical care in treating the plaintiff in the malpractice case.  
After determining that Dr. Graboff’s testimony violated the 
AAOS’s Standards of Professionalism, which require its 
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members to provide honest and accurate testimony when serving 
as expert witnesses, the AAOS suspended Dr. Graboff from 
membership for two years.  The AAOS published a description 
of the grievance proceedings in AAOS Now, an AAOS 
newsletter.  Dr. Graboff, who has resigned from the AAOS, then 
sued the AAOS, alleging that the AAOS Now article (the 
“article”) was actionable both as defamatory and a false-light 
invasion of privacy because it selectively recounted the 
circumstances of the grievance proceedings to imply that he had 
testified falsely.   
 At the conclusion of a trial the District Court submitted 
the case to the jury to answer interrogatories.  The jury answered 
that the article did not contain any false statements, but did 
contain statements portraying Dr. Graboff in a false light, and it 
awarded Dr. Graboff $196,000 in damages.  Though the jury 
through its answers did not address the ultimate question of 
whether the AAOS was liable on either the defamation or false-
light claim, the District Court treated the answers as having 
found in favor of Dr. Graboff on the false-light claim and in 
favor of the AAOS on the defamation claim.  The AAOS 
subsequently moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, 
but the Court denied the motion.   
 The AAOS appeals, arguing that, under the District 
Court’s treatment of the jury’s answers, the answers were 
inconsistent because, as a matter of law, the jury’s finding that 
the AAOS had not made false statements foreclosed the 
possibility that it could be liable on the false-light claim.  Thus, 
the AAOS contends that it was entitled to a judgment in its favor 
on both claims.  We, however, hold that the answers can be 
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reconciled and thus were not inconsistent.  But we conclude that 
the District Court erred by treating the jury’s findings as 
returning a verdict in Dr. Graboff’s favor only on the false-light 
claim as we are satisfied that the findings established that the 
AAOS was liable on both the false-light and defamation claims. 
 Nevertheless, the error was harmless and, accordingly, we will 




 In 2007, Dr. Graboff drafted an expert report that was 
used in Jones v. Meller, a malpractice case against Dr. Meller 
filed in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, 
Pennsylvania.  Dr. Graboff’s draft report stated that Dr. Meller’s 
treatment of the malpractice plaintiff departed from reasonable 
and accepted standards of medical care.  Although Dr. Graboff 
had included the words “Draft Report” in bold, underlined 
letters at the top of his report, the law firm representing the 
plaintiff in the Jones case, without Dr. Graboff’s consent or 
knowledge, whited out the “Draft Report” designation and used 
the report to obtain a settlement from Dr. Meller.     
 Dr. Meller filed a grievance against Dr. Graboff with the 
AAOS asserting that Dr. Graboff had provided false testimony 
in the malpractice case against him.  Dr. Meller based his 
grievance on the AAOS’s Standards of Professionalism which, 
among other provisions, require orthopaedists serving as expert 
witnesses to provide honest and accurate testimony.  The AAOS 
enforces these standards through its Professional Compliance 
Program Grievance Procedures.  These procedures provide that 
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AAOS members can file grievances with the AAOS when they 
believe that a fellow member has engaged in unprofessional 
conduct.  In Dr. Graboff’s case there were two hearings before 
AAOS administrative bodies.  At the first hearing, Dr. Meller 
confronted Dr. Graboff with x-rays of the Jones plaintiff that Dr. 
Graboff had not seen when he prepared his expert report.  Based 
on these x-rays, Dr. Graboff admitted that his report was flawed 
and that Dr. Meller’s treatment of his patient had satisfied the 
appropriate standard of care.  Dr. Graboff also testified that he 
believed his report had been preliminary, and that he had not 
expected it to be used in litigation.  Ultimately, however, the 
AAOS Board of Directors reached a final decision that Dr. 
Graboff had violated its Standards of Professionalism, and it 
suspended him from membership in the AAOS for two years.      
 Pursuant to its bylaws, the AAOS published a summary 
of the grievance proceedings against Dr. Graboff in AAOS 
Now, a publication available to both AAOS members and the 
public.  The article described the Jones case and the grievance 
proceedings against Dr. Graboff, but did not mention Dr. 
Graboff’s exculpatory testimony from the grievance proceedings 
that he considered the report to have been preliminary, that it 
had been altered, and that it had been used improperly to settle 
the case.  Instead, the article explained that Dr. Graboff “was 
initially absolute in his opinion that [Dr. Meller] had violated the 
standard of care,” but later “contradicted himself” and “admitted 
his report had been based on lack of information.”  JA 562.  The 
article was publicly available on the AAOS website and 
appeared in online searches of Dr. Graboff’s name.   
 On April 16, 2010, Dr. Graboff instituted this action 
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against the AAOS alleging, as we have explained, that the 
article was actionable as it was defamatory and was a false light 
invasion of privacy.  Though these charges set forth separate 
causes of action, the actions are related and include, as will be 
seen, certain common elements.  At the ensuing 12-day jury 
trial, Dr. Graboff testified that the article omitted the fact that 
his report had been a draft, made it seem that he had access to 
the x-rays prior to drafting the report, and implied that he 
intentionally had falsified information rather than explaining 
that the report had been a preliminary draft based on limited 
information.  Dr. Graboff, who, until the time of the publication 
of the article, frequently testified as an expert witness for both 
plaintiffs and defendants, including defendants’ insurance 
companies, also testified that his credibility as an expert witness 
suffered following the publication of the article.  Consequently, 
several of his longstanding clients terminated their relationships 
with him and, when testifying, he was subject to impeachment 
because of the article and his suspension from AAOS 
membership.   
 As we have indicated, the jury concluded that the AAOS 
had not made false statements in the article, but had made 
statements that portrayed Dr. Graboff in a false light and 
awarded him $196,000 in damages.  As we also have indicated, 
the District Court treated the jury’s findings as returning a 
verdict in favor of Dr. Graboff on the false-light-invasion-of-
privacy claim, but in favor of the AAOS on the defamation 
claim.     
 Following the return of the verdict, the AAOS moved for 
“judgment as a matter of law and for judgment notwithstanding 
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the verdict.”  JA 1219-20.1  Although the motion referred to 
both Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b), dealing with the 
renewal of motions after trial of earlier motions for a judgment 
as a matter of law, and Rule 59, dealing with motions for a new 
trial, and the District Court treated the motion as seeking both 
remedies, the AAOS made the motion exclusively under Rule 
50(b) because Rule 59 does not deal with motions for entry of 
judgment, the relief that the AAOS requested in the District 
Court.
2
  The Court in an exceptionally comprehensive opinion 
dated March 28, 2013, denied the AAOS’s motion and, in effect, 
sustained the damages verdict.  See Graboff v. Colleran Firm, 
                                                 
1
 An amendment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1991 
substituted the term “judgment as a matter of law” for the term 
“judgment notwithstanding the verdict” but did not make a 
substantive change in the law.  9 Moore’s Federal Practice – 




 On this appeal the AAOS has expanded on the relief it sought 
in the District Court as it asks as an alternative to granting it a 
judgment as a matter of law that we remand the case for a new 
trial.  As we have indicated, notwithstanding the AAOS’s 
reference to Rule 59, the District Court treated the Rule 59 
motion as seeking either a judgment as a matter of law or a new 
trial and it denied both motions.  We see no reason why the 
District Court should have granted a new trial and we therefore 
will not remand the case for that purpose. 
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III.  JURISDICTION and STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
    The District Court had jurisdiction based on diversity of 
citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and we have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the District Court’s denial 
of a motion for judgment as a matter of law de novo, Acumed 
LLC v. Advanced Surgical Servs., Inc., 561 F.3d 199, 211 (3d 
Cir. 2009), and ordinarily apply the same standard as a district 
court applies in considering a motion for judgment as a matter of 
law.  Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 204 (3d Cir. 2003).  
That standard requires a court of appeals to assess “whether, 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining 
the verdict, a reasonable jury could have found for the prevailing 
party.”  Id.; see also Lakeside Resort Enterps., LP v. Bd. of 
Sup’rs of Palmyra Twp., 455 F.3d 154, 156 (3d Cir. 2006).  Of 
course, in this case inasmuch as we reach our result by our 
treatment of the verdict and the AAOS does not challenge the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict, we make our 
determination by plenary application of legal principles. 
                                                 
3
 Dr. Graboff also sued defendants other than the AAOS and 
asserted claims for breach of contract, tortious interference of 
contract, and commercial disparagement, but we need not 
describe the proceedings on those aspects of his case because 
the proceedings with respect to these parties and claims have 
been terminated and are not at issue on this appeal.  We note, 
however, that the District Court addressed at length issues 
beyond those that we now consider. 
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IV. DISCUSSION 
 
 On this appeal we address the question of whether the 
jury’s finding that the article did not contain false statements 
precluded the District Court from treating the jury’s answers to 
the interrogatories to support the entry of a judgment in favor of 
Dr. Graboff on his false-light-invasion-of-privacy claim.  The 
AAOS argues that “the jury’s finding that the [a]rticle contained 
no false statements about Graboff is incompatible (or at least 
inconsistent) with its finding that the same [a]rticle portrayed 
Graboff in a false light.”  Appellants’ reply br. at 6-7. 4  The 
AAOS, in making its contention that the verdict was internally 
incompatible or inconsistent, points out that the Court’s 
instructions defined falsity broadly to include both false 
statements and true statements making a false implication.  
Inasmuch as it is presumed that a jury applies the court’s 
instructions as given, the AAOS argues that the jury necessarily 
found that the AAOS did not make any statements in the article 
that included a false implication with respect to Dr. Graboff.
5
  
Therefore, in its view, the Court erred by treating the findings as 
                                                 
4
 Although we believe that the AAOS did not raise this issue 
fully in the District Court either before the jury was dismissed or 
in its post-trial motion, we need not decide whether the AAOS 
waived the argument because Dr. Graboff does not argue that it 
did so.  See Marra v. Phila. Housing Auth., 497 F.3d 286, 312 
n.21 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 
5
 We presume that the jury followed the District Court’s 
instructions when arriving at its verdict.  See Weeks v. 
Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234, 120 S.Ct. 727, 733 (2000). 
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returning a verdict in favor of Dr. Graboff for false light 
invasion of privacy.  Rather, it contends that the Court should 
have read the answers to the interrogatories to reach a 
conclusion that the AAOS was not liable for either defamation 
or false light invasion of privacy.   
 Although we conclude that the AAOS’s contentions do 
not have merit, we also conclude that the District Court erred in 
its treatment of the jury’s answers for, contrary to that Court’s 
view, the answers support findings that the AAOS was liable for 
both defamation and false light invasion of privacy rather than 
only for the latter claim.  However, for the reasons we set forth, 
we conclude that the Court reached the correct result in denying 
AAOS’s post-trial motion, and its error thus was harmless.  
Therefore, we will affirm the denial of AAOS’s post-trial 
motion and, in effect, uphold the judgment entered against the 
AAOS.
6
     
A. Legal Framework and Jury Instructions on 
Defamation and False Light Invasion of Privacy 
 
 In light of the AAOS’s incompatibility or inconsistency 
contention with respect to the jury’s verdict, we discuss the 
elements of defamation and false light invasion of privacy under 
Pennsylvania law as the parties agree that Pennsylvania law is 
                                                 
6
 It is important to recognize that neither the District Court nor 
this Court has had the advantage of having precedential opinions 
of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on all of the state-law issues 
in this case. 
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applicable in this case.   
1.  Defamation 
 
 A claim for defamation claim under Pennsylvania law 
includes the following elements:  
 
(1) The defamatory character of the 
communication. 
(2) Its publication by the defendant. 
(3) Its application to the plaintiff. 
(4) The understanding by the recipient of its 
defamatory meaning. 
(5) The understanding by the recipient of it as 
intended to be applied to the plaintiff.   
 
Tucker v. Fischbein, 237 F.3d 275, 281 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting 
42 Pa. Const. Stat. Ann. § 8343(a) (West 1998)).  Procedurally, 
a trial court at the outset should decide whether a statement is 
capable of a defamatory meaning.
7
  Id. (citing Thomas Merton 
                                                 
7
Though the District Court apparently did not make this 
determination, neither party has raised this issue on this appeal, 
so we need not address whether the District Court’s bypassing 
of this issue was an error.  In any event, the oversight would 
have been harmless because the statements at issue undoubtedly 
are capable of a defamatory meaning.  See Hill v. Reederei F. 
Laeisz G.M.B.H., Rostock, 435 F.3d 404, 420 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(holding that harmless error requires asking whether it is “highly 
probable that the error did not affect the outcome of the case”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).   
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Ctr. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 442 A.2d 213, 215-16 (Pa. 1981)).  
If the court determines that a statement can support such a 
meaning, the jury then must decide “whether the recipient 
actually understood the statement to be defamatory.”  Id. at 281-
82 (citing Corabi v. Curtis Publ’g Co., 273 A.2d 899, 904 (Pa. 
1971)).   
 A statement is defamatory if “it tends so to harm the 
reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the 
community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing 
with him.”  Id. at 282 (quoting Birl v. Phila. Elec. Co., 167 A.2d 
472, 476 (Pa. 1960) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  But the 
statement must do more than merely embarrass or annoy the 
plaintiff; it must provoke “‘the kind of harm which has 
grievously fractured [one’s] standing in the community of 
respectable society.’”  Tucker v. Phila. Daily News, 848 A.2d 
113, 124 (Pa. 2004) (quoting Scott-Taylor, Inc. v. Stokes, 229 
A.2d 733, 734 (Pa. 1967)).   
 A defendant may avoid liability for defamation if it 
shows that its statements were “substantially true.”  See 42 Pa. 
Const. Stat. Ann. §  8343(b)(1) (West 2013); see also Dunlap v. 
Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 448 A.2d 6, 15 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) 
(“The proof of truth must go to the gist or sting of the 
defamation.”) (quoting Sack, Libel, Slander, and Related 
Problems at 50-51, 137-38 (1980) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  However, a defamatory statement must be viewed in 
context, Baker v. Lafayette Coll., 532 A.2d 399, 402 (Pa. 1987), 
and a defendant cannot use truth as a defense where “the 
implication of the communication as a whole was false,” even if 
the statement is “literally accura[te],” Dunlap, 448 A.2d at 15.  
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Though we are not aware of any Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
case on the point, inferior Pennsylvania courts applying 
Pennsylvania law have concluded that defamation may be 
established where a statement, viewed in context, creates a false 
implication.  See, e.g., id. (adopting defamation by innuendo 
theory); Mzamane v. Winfrey, 693 F. Supp. 2d 442, 476-78 
(E.D. Pa. 2010) (collecting cases approving a defamation-by-
implication theory).   
2.  False Light Invasion of Privacy 
 
 In Pennsylvania there can be four separate torts when 
there has been an invasion of privacy, one of which, publicity 
placing a person in a false light, is at issue here.  Marks v. Bell 
Tel. Co., 331 A.2d 424, 430 (Pa. 1975).  Pennsylvania has 
adopted the definition of false light invasion of privacy from the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, which imposes liability on a 
person who publishes material that “is not true, is highly 
offensive to a reasonable person, and is publicized with 
knowledge or in reckless disregard of its falsity.”  Larsen v. 
Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 543 A.2d 1181, 1188 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1988) (en banc) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E); 
see also Vogel v. W.T. Grant Co., 327 A.2d 133, 135-36 (Pa. 
1974) (adopting Restatement (Second) definitions for all four 
invasion of privacy claims).  Although to the best of our 
knowledge the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not addressed 
the contours of falsity in the false-light-invasion-of-privacy 
context, the Superior Court has defined falsity broadly in that 
context.  A plaintiff can establish falsity by showing that a 
defendant “selectively printed or broadcast true statements or 
pictures in a manner which created a false impression.”  Larsen, 
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543 A.2d at 1189.  Thus, even where a publication is literally 
true, “discrete presentation of information in a fashion which 
renders the publication susceptible to inferences casting one in a 
false light entitles the grievant to recompense for the wrong 
committed.”  Id. at 1189.  The Superior Court has drawn this 
broad definition from defamation law, which permits recovery 
where a publication was true, but implied falsehoods.  Id. (citing 
Dunlap, 448 A.2d at 15).  
 Applying this standard in Larsen, the Superior Court 
allowed the plaintiff’s claim to survive a motion to dismiss 
where he alleged that a series of articles, although literally true, 
conveyed a false impression that he had lied under oath.  Id.  See 
also Krajewski v. Gusoff, 53 A.3d 793, 809-10 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2012) (reversing dismissal of false-light claim where factual 
statements in article “suggest[ed] a causal relationship” that 
could not be proven), appeal dismissed, ____A.3d ____, 2014 
WL 321859 (Pa. Jan. 29, 2014); Santillo v. Reedel, 634 A.2d 
264, 267 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (“A false light claim can be 
established where true information is released if the information 
tends to imply falsehoods.”).   
 Falsity with respect to a defendant’s statements thus 
carries the same meaning in the defamation and false-light-
invasion-of-privacy contexts; indeed, the Superior Court drew 
its definition of falsity in the false-light-invasion-of-privacy 
context from its corresponding definition in the defamation 
context.  Larsen, 543 A.2d at 1189.  And Pennsylvania inferior 
courts consistently apply the same analysis to both types of 
claims when the causes of action are based on the same set of 
underlying facts.  See, e.g., Krajewski, 53 A.3d at 809 (using 
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discussion of statements as to defamation claim in false-light-
invasion-of-privacy context).  Accordingly, publication of 
factually correct statements that convey a false impression can 
be actionable as defamation (if the statements had a grievous 
effect on one’s reputation), or actionable as a false light invasion 
of privacy (if the statements would be highly offensive to a 
reasonable person).  Clearly there is little difference between 
these claims in dealing with the consequences of a defendant’s 
statements.   
3.  The Jury Instructions and the 
Interrogatories 
 
 The District Court’s instructions correctly told the jury 
that a defendant’s statements in the defamation context could be 
false if the statements included untrue statements or if the 
statements implied something that was untrue.  See JA 1198 (“A 
communication or any portion of it is defamatory if in context its 
stated or implied meaning is defamatory.”); JA 1199 (“A 
communication may be false either because it contains untrue or 
incomplete statements of fact, or because its implication is 
untrue.”).  The Court also correctly told the jury that the 
AAOS’s statements were presumed to be false, and that the 
AAOS had the burden to overcome this presumption and “to 
prove by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the 
communication was substantially true.”  JA 1199.  The Court, 
however, did not specifically charge the jury that a finding that 
the AAOS published a false statement was a prerequisite for Dr. 
Graboff to recover for false light invasion of privacy.  Rather, 
the Court stated that the AAOS could be liable for false light 
invasion of privacy if it published statements that placed Dr. 
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Graboff “before the public in a false light” and if the publication 
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.  JA 1202.  
This charge was correct as far as it went though it omitted an 
explanation that the AAOS could be liable in a false-light case if 
it made a factually untrue statement.   
As we have explained, the District Court did not submit 
the case to the jury by asking for general verdicts on the two 
alleged torts.  Instead, the Court submitted the case to the jury 
on interrogatories which, in addition to including a damages 
question that the jury needed to address only if it answered the 
liability questions in favor of Dr. Graboff, asked only three 
questions regarding liability on the tort claims involved on this 
appeal: (1) did Dr. Graboff show, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that the AAOS made statements in the article that 
were either false, or (2) portrayed Dr. Graboff in a false light, 
and (3) did the AAOS act knowingly or with reckless disregard 
for the truth of its statement?  JA 1262.  The jury found that the 
article did not contain false statements but that it did contain 
statements that portrayed Dr. Graboff in a false light and that the 
AAOS acted knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth.  
The completed interrogatories and answers read: 
6. Do you find that Dr. Steven Graboff 
proved by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons 
and American Association of Orthopaedic 
Surgeons (‘AAOS’) made statements in AAOS 
Now about Dr. Steven Graboff that:  
 
(a) Were false? 
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____YES  __X__ NO 
 
(b) Portrayed Dr. Steven Graboff in a false light? 
 
__X_YES  _____ NO 
 
If your answer to Question No. 6(a) or 
6(b) is “YES”, please proceed to Question No. 7. 
 If your answers to Question No. 6(a) and 6(b) 
are “NO”, please proceed to Question No. 9. 
 
7. Do you find that the American Academy 
of Orthopaedic Surgeons and American 
Association of Orthopaedic Surgeons (‘AAOS’) 
knew or acted in reckless disregard for the truth or 
untruth of statements in AAOS NOW that were 
false or portrayed Dr. Steven Graboff in a false 
light?   
 




We reiterate that the District Court treated these answers as 
                                                 
8
 This finding was sufficient to establish mens rea for both 
claims.  See American Future Sys., Inc. v. Better Bus. Bureau, 
923 A.2d 389, 400 (Pa. 2007) (explaining that a party may liable 
for defamation against a non-public figure if it acted 
negligently); Krajewski, 53 A.3d at 807 (requiring knowledge 
that the statements would be offensive to a reasonable person to 
recover on false light claim).   
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making a finding in favor of Dr. Graboff for false light invasion 
of privacy and in favor of the AAOS on the defamation claim.   
 
B. The Jury’s Verdict is Consistent 
 
 The AAOS challenges the jury’s verdict as “incompatible 
(or at least inconsistent).”  Appellants’ reply br. at 6-7.  The 
AAOS argues that because the Court defined falsity as including 
“true statements that create a false impression,” id. at 5, the 
jury’s finding in interrogatory 6(a) that the AAOS had not 
published false statements precludes imposing liability on it 
either for defamation or false light invasion of privacy.  In 
effect, the AAOS is arguing that, inasmuch as the jury found 
that it did not make false statements about Dr. Graboff, it could 
not have made statements portraying him in a false light.    
 We approach the incompatibility and inconsistency 
argument recognizing that “inconsistent jury verdicts are an 
unfortunate fact of life in law, and should not, in and of 
themselves, be used to overturn otherwise valid verdicts.”  
Boyanowski v. Capital Area Intermediate Unit, 215 F.3d 396, 
407 (3d Cir. 2000).  Rather, when faced with a seemingly 
inconsistent verdict, a court, to the extent possible, should read 
the verdict to resolve the inconsistencies.
9
  Pitts v. Delaware, 
                                                 
9
 The AAOS requests that we reverse the judgment and enter 
judgment in its favor, or, alternatively, that we reverse the 
judgment and remand the case for a new trial.  Appellants’ reply 
br. at 7.  The first request directly conflicts with Mosley v. 
Wilson, 102 F.3d 85, 91 (3d Cir. 1996), in which we held that 
the district court erred by “directing a judgment notwithstanding 
the jury’s verdict on one claim on the sole ground that it was 
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646 F.3d 151, 156 n.2 (3d Cir. 2011); see also Mosley v. 
Wilson, 102 F.3d 85, 90 (3d Cir. 1996) (noting that a court has a 
“‘duty to attempt to read the verdict in a manner that will resolve 
inconsistencies’” (quoting Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 
806, 106 S.Ct. 1571, 1576 (1986) (Stevens, J. dissenting))); 
Repola v. Mobark Indus., Inc., 934 F.2d 483, 494 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(characterizing duty to resolve inconsistencies in jury verdicts as 
a constitutional obligation).     
 
 We conclude that the answers to the interrogatories can 
be reconciled but that the District Court did not correctly treat 
the answers to resolve a possible inconsistency in them when it 
concluded that the jury found for the AAOS on the defamation 
claim and for Dr. Graboff on the false-light-invasion-of-privacy 
claim.  The Court, applying Pennsylvania law, explained to the 
jury that Dr. Graboff could prove his defamation claim if the 
AAOS published either untrue statements or true statements that 
implied something untrue.  The Court explained that the AAOS 
could be liable for false light invasion of privacy if it published 
statements that portrayed Dr. Graboff in a false light, but in so 
defining a false-light claim did not distinguish between untrue 
statements or statements that implied something untrue.  
Overall, when the entire charge is considered, it is clear that the 
Court split the bases for finding liability under the two causes of 
                                                                                                             
inconsistent with the jury’s verdict on another claim.”  Although 
reversal and remand for a new trial is one potential approach to 
resolving inconsistent verdicts, see Acumed LLC, 561 F.3d at 
217-18, where possible we have attempted to reconcile verdicts 
that seemingly were inconsistent.  See, e.g., Pitts, 646 F.3d at 
156 n.2.   
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action at issue into two possibilities:  i.e., factually false 
statements or statements whether or not true that implied 
something untrue.   
 The jury found that the AAOS had not published false 
statements, but had published statements that portrayed Dr. 
Graboff in a false light.  Under the instructions, these responses 
support a finding of liability for both defamation and false light 
invasion of privacy; after all, as the District Court explained to 
the jury, it was not necessary for the jury to find a statement was 
untrue for there to be a recovery on a defamation claim.  JA 
1199.  What the Court did, in effect, was to ask the false-light 
interrogatory twice, the first time as part of what the Court 
regarded to be the defamation claim interrogatory because 
falsity by implication was included in the definition of falsity 
and the second time in what the Court believed to be the false-
light claim interrogatory.  When we view the interrogatories in 
this way, the verdict was not inconsistent because the evidence 
supported a conclusion that the AAOS had made statements that 
were false inasmuch as they portrayed Dr. Graboff in a false 
light but that the statements were not factually false.   
 We cannot say that the jury did not follow the District 
Court’s instructions in returning its verdict for, notwithstanding 
the Court’s explanation that falsity includes statements false in 
themselves and statements false by implication, the Court 
separated the two categories of falsity and directed the jury to 
consider the categories in different answers, and the jury did 
exactly that.  But we believe that the Court erred in its treatment 
of the verdict because the legal consequence of the jury’s 
finding that the AAOS published statements portraying Dr. 
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Graboff in a false light was that the AAOS was liable on both 
claims even though the jury found that the article did not make a 
false statement.
10
  Properly applied, the jury’s determination 
trumps the AAOS’s argument that its finding that the AAOS did 
not make false statements about Dr. Graboff precluded a finding 
of liability on either claim.   
 The confusion here could have been avoided if the Court 
had combined the false statement and false light interrogatories 
into a single three-part interrogatory requiring an affirmative 
liability answer if the jury found that the AAOS made false 
statements about Dr. Graboff, portrayed him in a false light, or 
did both.  But inasmuch as the Court split the bases for a finding 
of liability it was required to enter a judgment in accordance 
with the answers the jury gave to the interrogatories by, if 
possible, reconciling the answers.   Though it attempted to do so 
we reiterate our conclusion that it erred when it treated the 
answers as finding for the AAOS on the defamation claim, but 
against it on the false-light claim.  In fact, the jury did not find 
for or against Dr. Graboff on the defamation claim as the Court 
did not submit the case to it to make an ultimate finding on 
either the defamation or false-light claim.  Rather, the jury 
simply answered the questions that the Court submitted to it and, 
as we have explained, the jury’s answers, in addition to 
supporting a judgment for Dr. Graboff on the false-light claim, 
supported a judgment that the AAOS was liable for defamation 
inasmuch as it could have defamed Dr. Graboff without making 
                                                 
10
 It cannot be contended seriously that the article did not have a 
grievous effect on Dr. Graboff’s reputation, an element of a 
defamation charge. 
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any statements that were false in themselves about him.       
But even though the District Court did not read the 
verdict as it could have and, indeed, should have to resolve any 
seeming inconsistency in the verdict, the error was harmless 
because once we reconcile the liability aspects of the verdict, as 
we have done, the damages finding easily stands.  The jury 
calculated damages for defamation and false light invasion of 
privacy together:  
10. Please state the amount of damages, if any, 
that Dr. Steven Graboff suffered as a result of the 
liability you found against the American Academy 
of Orthopaedic Surgeons and American 
Association of Orthopaedic Surgeons (“AAOS”). 
. . 
 
For Intentional Interference with Prospective 
Contractual Relations, Defamation, and/or 
Publication in a False Light:  
 
Past loss of earnings in a lump sum:
 $_____140,000___ 
Future loss of earnings in a lump sum:
 $_____0_________ 
Noneconomic loss in a lump sum: 
 $____56,000______ 
 
JA 1264.  Because the jury assessed damages for both claims as 
a single unit, our reading of the verdict to provide that the 
AAOS was liable both for defamation and false light invasion of 
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privacy allows the damages award to stand.  In these 
circumstances, the District Court’s error in treating the jury’s 
answers to the interrogatories so as to exonerate the AAOS on 
the defamation claim was harmless because the error had no 
effect on the outcome of the case.  See Hill v. Reederei F. Laeisz 
G.M.B.H., Rostock, 435 F.3d 404, 411 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(explaining that errors are harmless where it is “highly probable 
that the error did not affect the outcome of the case” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  Regardless of whether the jury 
found for Dr. Graboff only for false light invasion of privacy, as 
the District Court believed, or on both claims, its damage 
calculation would have been the same.
11





 For the foregoing reasons we will affirm the order of 
March 28, 2013, denying AAOS’s motion for judgment as a 
matter of law and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 
 
                                                 
11
 We also point out that Dr. Graboff has not cross-appealed 
from the judgment in favor of the AAOS on his defamation 
claim or asked us to remand the case for a new trial on damages 
only on both the defamation and false-light claims or, without 
disturbing the judgment in his favor on the false-light claim, on 
the defamation claim alone. 
